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INTRODUCTION
Ž . Abstract economies were introduced by Debreu 1952 in order to help in the proof of existence of Walras equilibrium for competitive economies Ž Ž . . Arrow and Debreu 1954 . They have since been used extensively in Ž Ž . general equilibrium theory see, e.g., Shafer and Sonnenschein 1975 , Ž . Ž .. Ichiishi 1983 , and Border 1985 . Abstract economies are essentially strategic games in which the feasible set of strategies of a player may depend on the strategies chosen by the other players. Thus, an abstract economy is a strategic game combined with a finite sequence of feasibility correspondences, one for each player. The main solution concept for Ž Ž . . abstract economies is the social equilibrium see Debreu 1952 , which is a generalization of the Nash equilibrium. We provide an axiomatization of the Nash correspondence of abstract economies.
We now briefly describe our result. Consider the class of all abstract Ž . economies with the following properties: i The strategy sets are convex Ž . and compact. ii The payoff functions are continuous and quasi-concave. Ž .
iii The feasibility correspondences are continuous and have nonempty convex values. Then, the Nash correspondence is the unique solution on the foregoing class of abstract economies that satisfies nonemptiness, rationality in one-person games, and consistency. The Nash correspondence has been axiomatized recently for various Ž Ž . Ž . classes of games see , and Norde Ž .. Ž . et al. 1996 . In particular, Norde et al. 1996 contains a complete characterization for the class of mixed extensions of finite games and for the class of games with continuous concave payoff functions. This paper is devoted to the characterization of the Nash correspondence of generalized games with quasi-concave payoff functions. Although we use some results Ž . Ž . of Norde et al. 1996 , our result does not directly follow from the foregoing papers. The main difficulty is that the class of quasi-concave functions, unlike the class of concave functions, is not closed Ž under addition i.e., the sum of two quasi-concave functions may not be . quasi-concave .
THE MODEL

Ž
. Let ⍀ be an infinite set the set of ''potential players'' . An abstract economy is a list
Ž . where N s N E ; ⍀ is a finite nonempty set the set of players ; A is 
Ž the set of feasible strategies of i when the rest of the players choose
Ž . Abstract economies were first studied in Debreu 1952 in connection with the Arrow᎐Debreu existence theorem of Walras equilibrium. They also later continued to play an important role in general equilibrium Ž Ž . Ž theory see, e.g., Shafer and Sonnenschein 1975 and Border 1985, .. Chapters 19 and 20 . Ž We shall consider the class the subscript q indicates that we deal q . with quasi-concave utility functions of abstract economies that have the following properties:
A is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of some
finite-dimensional Euclidean space E for every i g N.
Ž .
i uis continuous on the graph of F , gr F , for every i g N.
We recall that gr
For every i g N, F is continuous i.e., both upper
Ž .
hemi-continuous and lower hemi-continuous on A .
. yi For every i g N and x g A , F x is nonempty, Ž .
closed, and convex.
Without loss of generality we may assume
Ž . Indeed, the values of u on A E _gr F are completely arbitrary.
i i
A solution on is a function that assigns to each E g a subset
For example, the function SE, which assigns to each Ž . E g its set of social equilibria SE E , is a solution. A solution on 
economy of E with respect to S and x, E
S, x is given by
. used whenever x g A E and T ; N. Under the foregoing assumptions The following simple result is needed for the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Ž . By the definition of reduced games, 3.1 is equivalent to
Q.E.D.
Ž . Now we shall prove that SE и is the maximum solution on which q satisfies OPR and CONS. Ž . 
Ž .
We postpone the proof of Lemma 3.4 and shall now prove Theorem 3.1. Ž . Ž . Lemma 3.3, H s y . By CONS of , 3.4 , and 3.5 we obtain
Ž . Proof of Theorem
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Let
Ž . be a member of and x g SE E . We definê
in the following way:
where N l N s л, N s N , and N s N E .
Ž . Ž .
3.6
Ž . The existence of N H ; ⍀ is guaranteed by the fact that ⍀ is infinite.
We denote by t a bijection of N onto N q and we choose
Ž . In order to define u and F , i g N H , we need the following concepts 
for every i g N and x g A H and
where
Ž . As the reader may verify, F satisfies 2.4 and 2.5 for all i g N H .
i U
Ž .
In order to define u , i g N E , we first introduce auxiliary functions
for every x g A , and¨continuous on gr F . Using 3.10 we further
Ž . second family of auxiliary functions. For every i g N let w : A H ª ‫ޒ‬ i be given by
Ž . is an admissible payoff function for i g N E . Finally, we define
This completes the definition of H. Clearly, H g . Now we claim
y su y , x and w y s u x y y y x . Thus, for i ĝˆî
Ž . N E , y s x , because y is a best response to y . Therefore, our claim iŝ
Ž . proved. So far we have proved 3.2 ᎐ 3.4 . In order to prove 3.5 we Ž . observe that for all i g N E :
su x see 3.11 and 2.6 .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered the set of abstract economies with convex and compact strategy sets, continuous and quasi-concave payoff functions, and continuous and convex-valued feasibility correspondences. The Nash correspondence is completely characterized on the foregoing class of economies by the following three axioms: nonemptiness, rationality for one-person games, and consistency. 
The axiomatization of the Nash correspondence on ⌫ is not covered by q Ž . the results of Norde et al. 1996 . Also, our results may be generalized to Ž . infinite-dimensional strategy spaces. Indeed, one may replace 2.1 by a Ž weaker assumption. First, we recall that a normed linear space X with 5 5. norm и , is strictly con¨ex if for every pair of linearly independent 5 5 5 5 5 5 vectors x, y g X it holds that x q y -x q y . The following result is useful. Proof. It is well known that a compact set is separable, and hence the Ž affine hull of B the set
for all i with 1
is a countable dense subset of aff B. there is a retraction of B on A, because translations are continuous. Therefore we assume w.l.o.g. that 0 is a member of B, hence aff B is a linear subspace of X. Moreover, it can be assumed that aff B is a Banach space. Otherwise take a ''smallest'' completion of aff B. This new space inherits separability and convex or compact subsets of the original space Ž Ž . . retain these properties see p. 130 of Kothe 1966 . Thus aff B has ä Ž Ž . . strictly convex isomorphic norm see p. 160 of Day 1973 . The proof of existence of a retraction of a strictly convex normed space on a nonvoid convex compact subset is the same as the proof when the normed space is Euclidean.
Q.E.D. 
